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Introduction 
 
It is often assumed that in mature democracies party mergers are rare. Mair’s study of 
Western European parties found only 18 cases between 1945 and 1987, with almost half of 
them taking place in just two countries, Italy and Finland.1 Since the Second World War the 
only merger of relevant political parties in the United Kingdom was between the Social 
Democratic Party and Liberal Party in 1988. Unsurprisingly the literature on party merging 
was until recently quite limited. However, party mergers in consolidated democracies such 
as in Canada, the Netherlands and Germany in the post Cold War period has led to a 
renewed interest in the phenomenon.2 In fact a recent study that found 94 European party 
merger cases in the post-war period suggests mergers are becoming more common.3 
Party mergers are more frequent in new democracies where the party system is not yet fully 
institutionalised. Since the early 1990s the South Korean party system has featured a 
seemingly endless pattern of party splits and mergers.4 In another Asian democracy, Japan, 
party mergers have played a critical role in the development of its party system. For 
instance, after a period of extensive party splinters and new party start-ups, a major party 
merger between 1997 and 1998 allowed the Democratic Party of Japan to become a viable 
challenger to the Liberal Democratic Party for government.5 
Taiwan has experienced a more stable party system than its East Asian democratic 
neighbours. Although it has had periods when third parties have won significant vote and 
seat shares in the national parliaments, two parties, the Kuomintang (KMT) and Democratic 
Progressive Party (DPP) have dominated the party system since democratization began in 
the late 1980s. The relevant third parties have tended to be splinters that broke away from 
these mainstream parties. Belanger and Godbout define party mergers as “the fusion of two 
(or more) political parties into a single new party organization. As a result of the fusion, the 
former parties must cease to exist, to be replaced by a new political formation.”6 If we 
adopt this definition, then unlike its neighbours, Taiwan has not yet experienced a single 
case of party merging. 
 
Nevertheless, we cannot just drop the topic simply because Taiwan’s case does not fit nicely 
into this strict definition. Firstly, party mergers have received significant media attention in 
Taiwan in certain periods since democratization. Moreover there have been numerous cases 
of inter-party cooperation and negotiations with a view to party mergers. Thirdly, after 
 
1  Mair 1990. 
2 Lee, Hough and Keith 2010; Coffe and Torenvlied 2008; Belanger and Godbout 2010; Patton 2013. 
3 Ibenskas 2016, 343. 
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party splits there have been a number of de facto mergers or partial takeovers. These have 
seen new or mainstream parties attracting sufficient numbers of politicians to switch 
affiliation to almost wipe out the victim parties. Fourthly, though these victim parties were 
decimated by what were either hostile or negotiated takeover bids, generally these smaller 
parties were able to survive and in some cases even recovered much of their former 
electoral strength. This suggests that new concepts are required to understand these 
attempted mergers and takeovers. We also show that a number of these merger processes 
would have major impacts on the development of Taiwan’s party system, particularly the 
KMT’s return to power in 2008. Therefore we hope to make a contribution to the literature 
on political parties with the first comprehensive examination of party merger attempts in 
Taiwan. 
Literature Review 
 
One of our motivations for this study is that the Taiwanese literature on party mergers is 
very limited. For instance Liao and Tien & Liu examine cooperation between the KMT and its 
splinter party, the People First Party (PFP), but these papers were written at a time when 
the outcome of the process was still inconclusive.7 
Beyond Taiwan most studies of party merging are based on single cases and also single 
country cases. These have tended to generate country specific explanations. We are 
interested to see how well these approaches fit the Taiwan case. For example, Belanger and 
Godbout argue that the case of the Conservative Party of Canada shows how key factors 
leading to party merger were vote seat disproportionality, the desire to access new 
resources and the hope to rebrand the party.8 Lees, Hough and Keith particularly focus on 
the definable steps and processes leading to mergers.9 A first ingredient for a merger 
requires party elites to have a degree mutual trust to allow the merger process to be 
initiated. They expect a gradual transition from first cooperation towards merger. However, 
they also propose that the key player in a successful merger are not the party leaders but 
the working group made up of cross-party representatives tasked with establishing the 
practicalities of the merger. They also argue that there will need to be growing trust in the 
development team, increasingly delegation and reduced monitoring from the party 
leadership. 
 
According to Coffe and Torenvlied the most common explanation for party mergers is a 
response to poor election results and the expectation that merging will improve future 
performance.10 However, Mair’s study found a mixed picture on this point, noting that “the 
most striking impression is that fission and fusion have very limited electoral 
 
 
7 Liao 2004; Tien and Liu 2005. 
8 Belanger and Godbout 2010. 
9 Lee, Hough and Keith 2010. 
10 Coffe and Torenvlied 2008, 1. 
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consequences.”11 In approximately half of his examined cases in the previous election at 
least one of the merging parties had lost support and the other gained support. Out of the 
cases of merged parties Mair found that rather than receive an electoral payoff, they tended 
to lose.12 Therefore to understand the causes of party mergers we need to look beyond just 
electoral factors. 
 
Thus far only two studies have attempted to develop an integrated framework for 
understanding party mergers. In the first large cross-national study of party mergers 
Ibenskas proposes an explanatory framework that emphasizes the costs (such as ideological 
differences) and benefits (such as overcoming electoral thresholds or becoming a major 
player in the party system) of mergers.13 Coffe and Torenvlied suggest focusing on the 
interplay between inner-party, inter-party and contextual factors.14 Contextual factors that 
could promote the environment for mergers include changes to the electoral system, as well 
as electoral results. For example, they suggest that electoral systems with high thresholds 
should enhance the willingness of smaller parties to consider merging as they would 
struggle to be competitive on their own.15 A further contextual variable is electoral support 
levels. They note that electoral losses or the expectation of electoral losses will raise the 
interest in merging. Coffe and Torenvlied also argue that important inter-party factors 
include ideological proximity, as well as inter-party levels of trust or friendship. They note 
“Parties will opt for a partner in a merger only if the partner is similar in some salient 
respects.” In addition Mair notes, “Mergers derive from elite behavior, prompted by cross- 
party friendships.”16 In terms of inner party variables, they argue that “the relative power of 
the dominant party faction and the party leader in combination with their attitude towards 
a merger and potential merger partners determine the probability of a merger.”17 A final 
inner-party factor they suggest is the parties’ primary goals. They propose that vote or office 
seeking parties are more likely to opt for mergers than policy oriented parties. 
 
Research Questions and Framework 
 
To better understand the phenomenon, we examine four cases where party mergers or 
takeovers were attempted. We address three core questions (1) How should we best 
classify the actual outcomes? (2) How we can best explain the variation in outcomes? (3) 
How can we assess the success of merger/takeover attempts? 
The four cases we examine are (1) the Chinese Social Democratic Party (CSDP) and the New 
Party (NP) (1993-1994), (2) PFP and NP (2000-2001), (3) KMT and NP (2001-2005), and (4) 
 
11  Mair 1990, 140 
12  Mair 1990. 
13 Ibenskas 2016, 354. 
14 Coffe and Torenvlied 2008. 
15 Coffe and Torenvlied, 4 
16  Mair 1990, 140. 
17 Coffe and Torenvlied, 5. 
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KMT and PFP (2002-2008). Readers familiar with Taiwanese politics will immediately notice 
all but one are Pan Blue parties. While the KMT has experienced a number of party splits, 
the DPP has not suffered serious splits leading to the formation of new parties or featured in 
party mergers.18 Although there were some politicians defecting from the TSU to the DPP in 
2007 and some election cooperation, it is quite distinct from the cases examined here as 
there were not any negotiations with a view to a merger. In each case study we will classify 
the outcome of the process, attempt to explain the outcome, and assess the success of the 
merger/takeover. 
 
Table 1: Merger/Takeover Classification Scheme 
 
Relative Power Fusion Outcomes 
Equal/Similar Power Merger (NP-CSDP) Failed Merger (KMT-PFP 1) 
Unequal Power Negotiated Takeover (KMT-NP 
& KMT-PFP 2) 
Hostile Takeover (PFP-NP) or 
Failed Takeover 
 Cordial Hostile 
 Inter-party Relationship 
 
 
We believe more nuanced categories are required to better capture and understand the 
processes. We have adopted a classification scheme that incorporates the following five 
outcomes: (1) merger, (2) failed merger, (3) negotiated takeover, (4) hostile takeover, and (5) 
failed takeover. The classification scheme is illustrated in Table 1, with our classification for 
our case studies. We consider the relative power of parties and the relationship between 
different parties to classify the outcome. The two extremes for the first factor are 
equal/similar power and unequal power while the two extremes for the second one are 
cordial relationship and hostile inter-party relationship. In terms of classification types, we 
first distinguish between mergers and takeovers. We adopt a broader understanding of a 
merger than Belanger and Godbout, thus we define a merger as the fusion of two or more 
parties of similar sizes and where the process is defined as a merger by the parties 
themselves. Thus it is not essential that the former parties cease to exist or that a new party 
is created. We define a takeover as where one party essentially annexes a weaker or smaller 
political party. Thus the distinguishing feature of these two types is relative party power. 
However, we also distinguish between negotiated takeovers and hostile takeovers. In the 
former, relatively cordial negotiations lead to the stronger party taking control of the 
smaller party’s core assets (usually politicians), while hostile takeovers tend to feature high 
levels of antagonism as the large party attempts to poach and cherry pick the weaker 
 
 
18 Although two small parties did split off from the DPP in the mid 1990s, they had very limited impacts on the 
party system. 
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parties’ assets.19 Our classification scheme also includes the possibility that the talks are 
unsuccessful and the parties remain largely intact. We term these outcomes failed mergers 
or takeovers. Thus we take up the challenge posed by Lee, Hough and Keith to also bring 
failed merger attempts into the scope of analysis. 20 They argue that, “the inclusion of more 
cases of party merger – be they successful or unsuccessful – is essential if our framework is 
to be tested with the aim of it having predictive as well as explanatory value.”21 
In order to explain success and failure of attempted mergers we apply the framework 
proposed by Coffe and Torenvlied. Key contextual factors examined include the electoral 
system, electoral results and the relative size of the parties. In terms of the relative party 
sizes, we find that where party size is similar the environment will be more favourable for 
merger talks but where one party is far larger then a takeover is more likely. When it comes 
to inter-party variables, our cases show the importance of ideological proximity as well as 
the development of inter-party trust through previous cooperation. Lastly, we found that 
the key inner-party variable was the strength of party leaders supportive of mergers. 
We also consider how to assess the success of a merger or takeover. In the short-term a 
merger may allow a party to boost its electoral fortunes and expand its human resources. 
However, the long-term effect may be different. If the merger leads to a new party that is 
unified and has a coherent identity and ideology, then it can be deemed a success. However, 
if the new party later suffers bitter factional infighting and is ideologically divided, it is likely 
to damage its reputation and may lead to a breakup of the new party. Thus we also build on 
Bolleyer et al’s study on patterns of survival or termination of party mergers in Europe. 22 
Case 1: The Chinese Social Democratic Party and New Party: Taiwan’s only party merger 
 
On December 28, 1994 the Chinese Social Democratic Party (CSDP) announced at a press 
conference that the party had been dissolved and merged into the New Party (NP).23 Both 
were new parties, as the CSDP had been established in January 1991 and the NP only in 
August of 1993. This brought to an end a process that had begun in the autumn of the 
previous year, 1993. However the final outcome was rather different from what had been 
envisaged by some actors in the early negotiations. There was a hope on the part of the 
CSDP that they and the NP would be equal partners and that the CSDP’s party charter would 
represent the basis for the merged party’s policy platform.24  Moreover it was hoped that 
the party would also be able to incorporate the other leftist parties such as the Labor Party 
(LP).25 Also some in the CSDP had thought that the merged party might have a new name 
 
 
 
19 Ware (2009) calls the latter unbargained mergers. 
20 Lee, Hough and Keith 2010. 
21  Ibid 1315. 
22  Bolleyer et al, 2016. 
23  United Daily News (UDN), 29 December, 1994, 4. 
24  UDN, 13 November, 1993, 1. 
25 Ibid. 
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rather than continuing to use the NP label.26 However, when the formal merger did take 
place in December 1994, the CSDP was undoubtedly the junior partner in the merger and 
there was no longer any mention of the other leftist parties joining. Even on the issue of the 
party platform the CSDP was to be disappointed. As the CSDP founder Chu Kao-cheng (朱高 
正) explained, “From my standpoint, it was hard for me to refuse (to merge). We had 
internal meetings, the NP had agreed to adopt the CSDP’s party programme and so what 
was the problem of us accepting their party name? But later the NP broke their original 
promise. I never imagined how terrible the NP could be.”27 Nevertheless, among our four 
cases, this is the closest to our definition of a party merger due to the relatively similar party 
power and cordial inter-party relations. 
 
Contextual Factors 
 
The first place to start to explain the outcome of this process is election results. The CSDP 
had nominated extensively in the National Assembly elections in 1991 and the 1992 
Legislative Yuan elections, with 58 and 25 candidates respectively. However, apart from the 
CSDP’s leader Chu Kao-cheng retaining his legislative seat, no other CSDP politicians won 
election. The other leftist parties had even worse electoral records. In contrast, though the 
NP had not yet been formed in the previous round of national elections in 1992, its founders 
had performed well winning election either representing the KMT or as KMT rebels. At the 
time of negotiations the NP had six sitting legislators to the CSDP’s one. There was the 
expectation that under the SNTV electoral system used for parliamentary elections, the 
merged party would be able to become established in the party system. 
Previous election results and human resources gave the NP a clear advantage in the merger 
negotiations. This meant that the LP held little attraction to the NP and soon became 
forgotten in the merger process. For Chu the merger was particularly attractive as the CSDP 
had failed electorally and his ability to influence national affairs was likely to be limited if he 
chose to persist with the CSDP. However, the parties’ relative size was critical to why the 
process was officially described as a merger rather than a simple takeover. In other words, 
the CSDP had enough resources to negotiate a merger and the key lay in Chu himself. Chu 
was one of the most charismatic and well known Taiwanese politicians of the late 1980s and 
early 1990s. He had been educated in Germany and a founding member of the DPP. Chu’s 
strengths were the NP’s weaknesses. While most of the NP’s founders were Mainlanders 
who could not speak Taiwanese, and whose political base was Taipei, Chu was Taiwanese 
and had been based initially in the south central county of Yunlin. NP Convenor Hsieh Chi-ta 
(謝啟大) explained the attraction that Chu held for their party initially, “The NP felt that at 
 
 
 
 
 
26  UDN, 19 October, 1993, 2. 
27 Interview, Kaohsiung, 9 October 2001. 
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the time no one was paying attention to the NP, so we thought let’s let Chu Kao-cheng stand 
for us. We brought in an important controversial politician, this was a crucial moment.”28 
Inter-party factors 
 
The prospects of party merging are greater where there are high levels of ideological 
similarity between parties. On the surface a merger between a leftist party and a party 
perceived as a conservative Chinese nationalist grouping in Taiwan may seem quite 
challenging. In fact when soon after the NP was formed Chu was asked whether he would 
join the party, he responded he would not because “when you have different ideals, it can 
be miserable to share the same bed but have different dreams.” 29 However, they shared 
much common ground on the core political dimension of national identity. When asked why 
he left the DPP in 1989 Chu explained, “It was because I disagreed with Taiwan 
Independence.”30 The NP’s most frequently used appeal has been opposing Taiwan 
independence.31 On the question of how to resolve cross-Strait relations the two parties 
were also ideologically closely matched. For while the NP supported Chinese unification, the 
CSDP called for a Chinese Federal Republic (中華聯邦共和國) after China’s 
democratization.32 
Beyond ideological proximity is the critical issue of inter-party trust. This needed to be built 
from scratch as originally in their former parties the NP founders and Chu had been at 
opposite ends of the political spectrum. As suggested by Lee, Hough and Keith, trust was 
accumulated between the parties during an initial cooperation phase.33 Within weeks of the 
NP being formed there were discussions about cooperation between the parties at the local 
level in Taichung.34 More importantly behind the scenes a trusted go-between played a key 
role in bringing the two sides together. Although Yao Li-ming (姚立明) had not joined the 
NP initially, he had got to know many of the NP founders when he was in the KMT. Yao 
explained the process, “I introduced Chu Kao-cheng into the NP, and the other was Huang 
Kuo-chung (黃國鐘). Why did I introduce these two? They were both from the CSDP, party 
founders. They were both very professional and studied law and philosophy. They were 
friends I knew from my time in Germany.”35 By September NP founder Lee Ching-hua (李慶 
華) had openly invited Chu to join the NP.36 As negotiations progressed Chu explained that 
they would need to first cooperate before merging.37 The parties were able to build up trust 
as in the 1993 local elections Chu personally campaigned and mobilized supporters to help 
 
28 Interview, Kaohsiung, 7 September 2001. 
29  UDN 31 July 1993, 2. 
30 Interview, Kaohsiung, 9 October 2001. 
31  Fell 2005, 93. 
32 CSDP newspaper ad, China Times 20 December, 1991, 8. 
33 Lee, Hough and Keith 2010. 
34  UDN 10 August 1993, 2 
35 Interview, Kaohsiung, 3 December 2004. 
36  UDN, 22 September 1993, 4. 
37  UDN, October 19, 1993, 2. 
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the NP campaigns. This trust was further strengthened in the build up to the formal merger 
in 1994. Chu resigned as CSDP Chair and joined the NP to stand as their candidate for the 
Provincial Governor race of 1994. According to Chu this campaign was critical in helping the 
NP to develop beyond Taipei, “The problem was they (NP) didn’t have any power in Taiwan 
Province, we had to rely on the hard work of CSDP cadres. And at the time I got a lot of 
votes, almost half a million.”38 After over a year of pre-merger cooperation the relationship 
between the parties had developed well. Thus a week before the formal merger, the NP’s 
Convenor Wang Chien-hsuan (王建煊) stated that “If the CSDP completes the legal process 
of dissolving itself then the NP and CSDP will be effectively married.”39 
Inner Party Factors 
 
The final element of the framework examines inner party variables. Here particularly 
important is the attitude of the dominant party leaders and factions towards mergers. In the 
cases of both the NP and the CSDP there was some disquiet about the proposed merger. As 
the relative strength of the two parties widened in the NP’s favour some in the party felt 
that there was no longer a need to merge the parties but instead it would be best just to 
allow individual CSDP members to join. Just days before the actual marriage, NP founder Yu 
Mu-ming (郁慕明) stated that “there should absolutely not be a merger (of the two).”40 In 
contrast opposition towards merger was more common at the grassroots level in the CSDP. 
The main concern was how they saw the NP as reneging on the merger agreement from the 
previous year, in particular its promise to make the CSDP’s charter the basis for its policy 
platform.41 However, the internal power dynamics in both parties ensured the merger was 
completed. 
 
When the NP was established it did not have a single dominant leader. Instead the party 
was dominated by 6-7 figures of similar stature. Despite the relatively small size of the party, 
it has tended to be highly factionalised and for much of the 1990s the party experienced 
very bitter internal fighting centred on these rival personal factions. However, when it came 
to the CSDP merger, enough of the founding leaders were supportive to prevent the process 
becoming derailed in 1994. In contrast, the CSDP was widely seen as a one man party. Chu 
was so dominant within the party that the CSDP was unimaginable without him. Even 
though he was no longer holding party office at the time of the merger, Chu was influential 
enough to ensure the party went along with the merger agreement and brought in 
significant human resources into the merged party. 
 
Success of the merger 
 
 
 
 
38 Interview, Kaohsiung, 9 October 2001. 
39Ibid. 1. 
40  UDN, 10 December 1994, 3. 
41  UDN 24 December 1994, 4. 
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This was at least initially a relatively complete merger, as unlike the subsequent three cases 
the CSDP did actually dissolve itself. Chu brought with him a core group of CSDP cadres and 
six former CSDP politicians later stood for the NP. If we consider that the CSDP had 58 
candidates in 1991, then it should be clear that the vast majority did not follow Chu into the 
NP but instead most simply left politics. One famous example is the Taiwanese film director 
Hou Hsiao-hsien (侯孝賢), who was listed second on the CSDP’s party list in 1992. 
 
Electorally the merger did have a significant impact on the party system, as the NP made a 
major breakthrough in the 1995 and 1996 national elections. After a number of failed 
attempts at establishing a relevant third party, the merger enabled the NP to break the 
DPP/KMT monopoly of the party system. The impact of the CSDP was revealed when Chu 
and his former CSDP Chairman Huang Kuo-chung were able to develop the NP’s base in the 
southern city of Kaohsiung after the party merger, with both winning legislative races in the 
city in 1995. 
While the merger was initially quite successful, in the longer-term it can be regarded as a 
failure. Chu and the CSDP group remained a small faction in the NP and were often 
marginalised by party founders. Chu engaged in bitter disputes with a number of NP figures 
and in March 1997 the NP expelled Chu for damaging the party’s reputation.42 Rather than 
be deselected Huang chose to switch to the KMT. By 1998 elections the CSDP component of 
the NP had been lost. 43 To borrow Bolleyer et al’s terminology, the merged party had been 
terminated. 44 In fact according to former NP Chair Hsieh Chi-ta “The NP’s problems began 
from that time (when Chu joined.)…The problem with Chu Kao-cheng is that he cannot get 
along with others. Probably the two people that did the most damage to the NP are Chu 
Kao-cheng and Lee Ching-hua.”45 
Case 2: The People First Party and the New Party: A hostile takeover 
 
Our second case stands in stark contrast with the NP-CSDP merger. This time though there 
were some negotiations, it was essentially an attempt by the PFP to carry out a hostile 
takeover of the NP. The PFP’s objective was to become the largest party in the Pan Blue 
camp and it aimed to do this by recruiting politicians from both the KMT and the NP. The 
process towards this hostile takeover began in the run up to the 2000 presidential election. 
The NP had been deeply divided over how to handle this election. Although the NP had its 
own presidential candidate in Li Ao (李敖), the party’s factional leaders were divided over 
whether to support the official KMT candidate Lien Chan (連戰) or the KMT rebel James 
Soong (宋楚瑜). On the day before the election NP Convenor Lee Ching-hua suddenly 
announced his open support for Soong. Although Soong narrowly lost the presidential 
 
42  UDN 10 March 1997, 1. 
43 Even the matchmaker Yao Li-ming had been forced out of the party and stood as an independent in 1998. 
44  Bolleyer et al 2016, 642. 
45 Interview, Kaohsiung, 7 September 2001. 
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election he formed the PFP in April 2000. As soon as the election was over the media was 
speculating over whether the NP would merge with the new party that Soong was preparing 
to establish.46 With a range of upcoming national and local elections, the PFP needed large 
numbers of candidates and began actively recruiting KMT, NP and non affiliated politicians. 
One study of party switching found 22 cases of politicians making the switch from the NP to 
PFP between 2000 and 2002.47 The defections from the KMT to the PFP were even higher 
but to a small party like the NP such a level of outswitching was devastating. 
 
Initially the relationship between the NP and the PFP was friendly but relations began to 
sour as the PFP became more aggressive in its attitude towards the NP in early 2001. Rather 
than working together the two parties became highly antagonistic in the run up to the 
December 2001 legislative election. The election marked the end of the wave of NP to PFP 
defections. Although the NP was not completely taken over by the PFP, the scale of 
defections and the inter-party antagonism leads us to categorise this case as a hostile 
takeover. 
 
Contextual factors 
 
The first place to start explaining this takeover is electoral patterns and the electoral system. 
In 1998 the NP had suffered a severe electoral setback. The party lost half its legislators, 
falling from 21 to 11.48 The NP’s disastrous handling of the 2000 presidential also severely 
damaged the party’s morale and reputation. In contrast the PFP was a party clearly on the 
rise. While the NP had only been relevant in SNTV elections, Soong’s performance in the 
2000 presidential election gave his new party a major advantage over the NP. Moreover, 
high PFP party identification in 2000 and 2001 and inswitches from other parties had given 
the PFP a high degree of confidence. Hsieh’s comment gives a sense of the mood among NP 
politicians at the time the PFP was established, “Many of our opportunists switched to the 
PFP. Out of the 100 candidates the NP had cultivated four fifths switched to the PFP. He 
(Soong) seemed to take it for granted he could take our people.”49 This relative size 
advantage partly accounts for the aggressive stance the PFP took in dealing with the NP. 
This aggressive style would later backfire and pushed the NP closer to the KMT. While in the 
previous case the merger was motivated by the desire to enter the party system, the PFP’s 
takeover bid was designed to make it the largest opposition party and potentially even to 
control central government on the back of a presidential election. 
 
Inter-party factors 
 
On paper it would seem that the PFP and NP were ideologically much closer than the first 
merger case. Both are splinters from the KMT and relied on a similar core set of voters. 
 
46   UDN 20 March 2000, 4. 
47  Fell 2014a. 
48 The seat share decline was worse than the reduction in the number of seats because the overall size of 
parliament had been expanded in 1998 to 225 seats. 
49 Interview, Kaohsiung, 7 September 2001. 
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However, ideology was something that actually kept the parties apart in the takeover period. 
Many vote seeking NP politicians were happy to switch on to the PFP bandwagon in the 
wake of Soong’s almost successful presidential campaign. However, politicians at the centre 
of the NP in 2000-2001 were not satisfied with Soong’s position on unification with China 
and even issued a newspaper advertisement in July 2001 demanding Soong make his 
position clearer. The ad brought the NP-PFP tensions into public attention and provoked an 
angry response from PFP Vice Chair Chang Chao-hsiung  (張昭雄).50   As Hsieh explained, 
“Some say James Soong is fine, he can do this job. But James Soong has a problem. James 
Soong still wants to be president, so to be president he can’t just rely on Pan KMT votes. He 
wants to get middle, even Taiwan independence votes. So on this point he can’t be clear on 
China policy, he dares not state his position, he always takes the middle line. So I think this 
is bad.”51 The NP had been satisfied with being a small ideologically pure Chinese nationalist 
party and had been able to survive in its heartland in SNTV elections. In contrast, Soong 
needed to take a more ambiguous stance on China relations in order to appeal to a broader 
support base. Public opinion trends meant the market for extreme Chinese nationalism had 
been on the decline since the mid 1990s, thus Soong’s stance was rational from an electoral 
point of view but created distrust among the NP leaders. This also partly explains how Soong 
was selective in which NP politicians the PFP tried to poach. As Hsieh explained, “Some 
people James Soong liked he brought into his party. Others James Soong did not want. He 
didn’t want those too close to Mainland China, like Elmer Feng (馮滬祥).”52 
As we saw in the previous case, inter-party trust is important in successful party mergers. 
Although the PFP and NP came from the same party their experience of working together in 
the KMT in the early 1990s and late 1980s had left lingering bad feeling. Soong had been a 
close ally of Lee Teng-hui in this period, serving as KMT Secretary General. This meant that 
he was viewed as being part of the effort to marginalise mainlanders and the forerunner of 
the NP, the New KMT Alliance. This was a factor in why some NP members had preferred to 
support Lien over Soong in the presidential race and still distrusted Soong. Thus unlike the 
CSDP-NP, the NP and PFP did not have experience of trust-building pre-merger cooperation. 
The negotiations between the two parties in 2000-2001 also revealed the aggressive 
approach coming from the Soong camp and this explains the lack of trust towards the PFP 
on the NP’s part. 
Inner party factors 
 
Lastly, despite the above electoral and inter-party factors, it is possible that if there had 
been a different leadership within the NP the eventual outcome could have been quite 
different. For instance, if Lee Ching-hua had remained NP Convenor it is quite likely that he 
 
 
50  UDN 29 July 2001, 18. 
51 Interview, Kaohsiung, 7 September 2001. 
52 Interview, Kaohsiung, 7 September 2001. Feng is the only elected Taiwanese politicians to have spoken 
positively about the PRC’s proposal for unification One Country Two Systems. 
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would have tried to engineer some kind of negotiated takeover. Similarly after Lee left, 
under the new Convenor Hau Lung-bin (郝龍斌) the NP maintained quite cordial relations 
with the PFP, with numerous party level meetings.53 In late 2000 the NP also announced it 
would be willing to support KMT and PFP local executive candidates in the next year’s 
elections.54 According to Hsieh Chi-ta Hau’s convenorship offered some protection to the NP 
against the PFP, “Under Hau Lung-bin it was felt that the NP, KMT and PFP could work 
together, as Hao Lung-bin is (former premier) Hau Pei-tsun’s son. He (Soong) wouldn’t dare 
bully Hau Pei-tsun’s son.”55 
The turning point in the NP-PFP relations came with the sudden decision by Hau Lung-bin to 
quit as NP Convenor and join the DPP cabinet as Environment Minister in March of 2001. In 
his place Hsieh Chi-ta became convenor and she worked closely with Kao Hsin-wu (高新武). 
Hsieh described the new mood, “James Soong went to Kao Hsin-wu’s house the night Hau 
Lung-bin decided to leave. He wanted to make the NP his own party…..Mr Kao told him the 
NP would not collapse. So then he left.”56 
In April 2001 Soong visited the NP for negotiations that amounted to an attempted hostile 
takeover. NP figures accused Soong of demanding that the NP lend him their generals (借將) 
in the form of giving them key party figures such as Wang Chien-hsuan, Chou Yang-shan (周 
陽山) and Kao Hsin-wu for the PFP party list. However, NP sources stated that he was flatly 
turned down.57 Hsieh’s comments give an insight into the party interaction, “He (Soong) 
said he wanted Feng Ting-kuo (馮定國) in Taichung County. We told him you cannot do this 
as the NP is already small, you can’t do this. We said you want seats and we want votes. 
Since Feng Ting-kuo has decided to go, we’ll let him go. Before the election he counts as 
ours, he’ll keep the NP label and James Soong can speak for him at the rally and after the 
election we’ll give him to you.”58 Neither this proposal nor NP proposed nomination 
cooperation in Kinmen was acceptable to Soong. As Hsieh recalled, “It’s terrible. He wanted 
everything. In the negotiations he wanted the best and to give us the leftovers.” 59 
end the negotiations failed. 
So in the 
 
This initial clash between the new NP leadership and the PFP set the tone for the rest of the 
campaign in 2001. As Hsieh recalled, “We decided after the Feng Ting-kuo incident to 
counterattack, we scolded Feng Ting-kuo and James Soong. We felt that before we were 
good to you, why do you take our property when we are at our lowest point?”60 Similarly, in 
August of 2001 the PFP Vice Chairman accused the NP leadership of being selfish and 
 
53UDN 31 October, 2000, 2. 
54  UDN, 3 December 2000, 2. 
55 Interview, Kaohsiung, 7 September 2001. 
56 Interview, Kaohsiung, 7 September 2001. 
57  UDN 14 April 2001, 4. 
58 Interview, Kaohsiung, 7 September 2001. 
59 Interview, Kaohsiung, 7 September 2001. 
60 Ibid. 
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argued that the NP’s bid to exceed five percent by nominating extensively could undermine 
the overall Pan Blue prospects and lead the camp to lose 35 seats. In response the NP’s Kao 
Hsin-wu argued that “the PFP’s attitude endangered the three-party cooperation, the 
Republic of China and the PFP itself and even promoted the momentum of Taiwan 
independence.”61 In short, hostile leadership attitudes played a key role in the way the 
process developed. 
 
Success of the PFP takeover 
 
On some levels PFP’s takeover bid was initially a success. There was the high number of NP- 
PFP defections. In addition, the PFP did extremely well in the 2001 campaign, winning an 
impressive 46 seats or the highest ever won by a non mainstream party. This election saw 
the NP reduced to a single legislator out of its 41 candidates. However, the NP fiercely 
resisted the PFP’s takeover bid and was able to maintain its independent status as many on 
the PFP’s poaching wish list stayed put. Moreover, the NP nominated very extensively in 
2001 particularly where the PFP had strong candidates, seemingly with the aim of 
undermining the chances of PFP candidates. If the PFP had taken a more negotiated 
approach, it is possible the party could have performed even better in 2001, allowing it to 
potentially overtake the KMT as the largest opposition party. In the longer term the 
takeover can also be seen as a failed one. The relative strength of the KMT and PFP would 
later have implications over who would be the Pan Blue presidential candidate in 2004. In 
fact in the period between 2000 and 2002 the PFP had higher levels of party identification 
than the KMT. The KMT’s higher numbers of legislators (as well as financial resources) gave 
it an advantage over the PFP when it came to decide who would be their joint presidential 
candidate in 2004. Moreover, the PFP’s takeover attempt turned its potential allies into 
bitter enemies and contributed towards the NP’s subsequent drift back towards the KMT. 
This is the topic of the next case study. 
Case 3: The Kuomintang and New Party: A negotiated takeover 
 
After splitting away from the KMT in 1993 the NP had an antagonistic relationship with the 
KMT until 2000. The party was highly damaging to the KMT, as it tended to target KMT 
voters and politicians to defect. However, NP-KMT relations gradually warmed after the 
KMT had lost power in 2000 and Lien Chan replaced Lee Teng-hui as KMT Chairman. The 
first fruits of this cooperation for the NP was the agreement of the KMT (and PFP) to 
support a NP candidate, party founder Wang Chien-hsuan as the joint Pan Blue candidate 
using the NP label for Taipei County local executive in 2001. 
The first calls for a NP-KMT merger came from NP legislative candidates in the run up to the 
2001 elections. In November NP founder Yu Mu-ming proposed a three into one (三合一) 
merging of the KMT-NP-PFP. It was reported that the post merger party name would be the 
 
 
61  UDN, 6 August 2001, 2. 
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New KMT (新國民黨).62 Two weeks later on the eve of the elections another NP candidate 
Alex Fai (費鴻泰) announced that under certain conditions he would return to the KMT. This 
was viewed by analysts as going further than Yu, as Yu’s vision was of the three parties 
coming together on the basis of equal status.63 The NP Convenor Hsieh responded to Fai’s 
announcement by explaining that if Fai joined the KMT he would immediately be expelled 
from the NP.64 The KMT also reacted cautiously to suggestions of merger. For instance, the 
KMT’s Chao Shou-po (趙守博 ) argued that this was not the right time for talking about 
mergers in the midst of the campaign. Also he stated that though the KMT welcomed 
politicians to return to the KMT the party would not be willing to lose its name for the sake 
of a merger.65 
Following the NP’s disastrous defeat in 2001 talk of a NP-KMT merger faded from attention. 
Hsieh was replaced as party chair by Yu and the priority for the NP became survival. The NP 
came out strongly in support of a joint Pan Blue ticket for the 2004 presidential election led 
by Lien Chan. However, Yu made it clear that he favoured cooperation rather than a 
merger. 66 Yu explained that he was supportive of the idea of a PFP-KMT merger, but that 
the NP preferred to go its own way for the time being. 
 
Despite Yu’s reservation the process towards NP-KMT integration moved forward in the 
second half of 2004. An electoral alliance was agreed in September that allowed eight NP 
members to stand as KMT candidates in the December 2004 legislative elections.67 In 
addition the NP explained that after winning election the legislators would revert to NP 
affiliation and become an independent party caucus.68 
 
Out of the NP candidates standing under the KMT banner three were successfully elected in 
2004. After Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) became KMT chairman in July 2005 talk of a party merger 
again disappeared. Instead the KMT began a clearer takeover of NP assets. For instance, the 
three legislators ended their dual membership in August.69 Since 2005 there have been 
occasional defections towards the KMT such as Hau Lung-bin in order to stand for the KMT 
as Taipei mayoral candidate in 2006 and even a smaller number defecting in the opposite 
direction.70 However, unlike in the past these switches have not affected the collaborative 
relationship between the parties. Therefore we have classified this case as a negotiated 
takeover. 
 
Contextual factors 
 
 
 
62  UDN, 16 November 2001, 3. 
63  UDN, 27 November, 2001, 4. 
64  UDN, 5 December 2001, 2. 
65  UDN, 17 November 2001, 2. 
66  UDN 27 January, 2003, 6. 
67 UDN 9 September 2004, A10. 
68  UDN, 27 September 2004, 4. 
69  UDN 17 August, 2005, 4. 
70 In 2008 Lee Sheng-feng (李勝峰) and Joanna Lei ( 雷倩) returned to stand for the NP for its party list. 
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Elections and the electoral system again played a role in the KMT’s negotiated takeover of 
the NP. The emergence of the DPP as the ruling party in 2000, the NP-PFP hostility and the 
DPP’s retention of power in 2004 served to bring the NP and KMT closer together. The 2001 
legislative elections also had a major effect on the integration process. The NP candidates 
raising merger or returning to the KMT prior to the election suggests they were clearly 
aware of the danger of losing under a NP banner. Moreover the experience of the total 
defeat of its candidates in 2001 made the NP more open to the idea of the negotiated 
takeover for the 2004 legislative elections. The relative sizes of the KMT and NP meant that 
the KMT could dominate the takeover process. Lastly, the new Single Member District two 
vote electoral system that was approved in 2005 squeezed the space for all smaller parties, 
including the NP. This explains why after 2005 the party has only been able to focus its 
efforts on the SNTV Taipei city council and the proportional party list component of 
legislative elections. 
 
Inter-party factors 
 
The NP is perhaps the closest Taiwanese example of a primarily policy seeking party, thus 
we should expect policy matters to be especially influential in its return to the KMT. For 
instance, Elmer Feng had argued a reason for calling for a merger in late 2001 was that the 
“KMT had bid farewell to the Lee Teng-hui line.”71 Here Feng is referring to the KMT’s shift 
back towards Chinese nationalist positions after Lee Teng-hui left in 2000. The KMT 
continued to move closer ideologically to the NP while in opposition. As a former KMT 
Propaganda Chief Huang Hui-chen (黃輝珍) explained in late 2001, “At present those 
controlling the KMT’s ideology are inclined towards the NP force.”72 After 2001 this 
convergence continued. For instance, the KMT visits to China in 2005 followed the 
precedent set by the NP’s talks with the CCP in 2001. Ma’s China policy prior to and after 
coming to power in 2008 essentially followed a blueprint left by the NP in the late 1990s and 
early post 2000s. In the summer of 2004 Yu remarked that once the KMT made a clean break 
from the localization line, he would no longer object to a merger. 73 Hsieh even likened the 
changed relationship to the story of Snow White. “We left because the KMT chairman (Lee 
Teng-hui) wasn’t Chinese. He bullied Chinese, we could see it. It was like in Snow White 
where the father marries a stepmother and the stepmother kicks out Snow White. We were 
like Snow White. We had been kicked out. But after the stepmother was kicked out we could 
have a good relationship with the family again.”74 
 
However, as in the PFP-NP case, ideology was also something that kept the KMT-NP from 
fully merging. The KMT needed to take a relatively moderate line on relations with China in 
order to win national power and thus fully absorbing the NP risked giving it the reputation 
for extremism. Thus it was safer from a KMT perspective to keep the NP as a separate but 
allied party. 
 
 
 
71 Fell 2005, 109. 
72 Interview, Taipei, 26 September 2001. 
73  UDN, 14 August 2004, A4. 
 
74 Interview, Kaohsiung September 7, 2001 
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Inter-party trust and friendships have also been critical to the renewed embrace of the two 
parties. In other words, first Lien Chan and then Ma were able to build up a good working 
relationship and election campaign cooperation with the NP leadership after 2001, and this 
has largely been maintained to this day. 
 
Inner party factors 
 
Lastly changing inner party variables contributed to the closer relationship. In addition to 
Lee’s departure from the KMT, the passing of NP leadership from the Hsieh to Yu was 
central to the more cooperative relationship between the NP and KMT. Yu was willing to 
allow the KMT to take over NP assets in 2005. The NP had originally been an element in the 
KMT Non Mainstream faction that had been marginalised in the party in the mid 1990s. 
However, after Lien became KMT chairman in 2000 the Non Mainstream Faction again 
became influential in the KMT party headquarters, making it easier for the NP to be brought 
back into the fold. Similarly there was a difference in the attitudes of Lien and Ma towards 
the NP, in that while the former was much more open to the idea of party merger, Ma 
preferred a friendly but de facto takeover of the NP. 
 
Success of the takeover? 
 
Generally it is assumed that the smaller party in a merger will be assimilated by the larger 
party. At least ideologically, this NP-KMT takeover case challenges that assumption as over 
time the KMT has moved closer to the NP’s positions since 2001. In fact following the KMT’s 
nomination of Hung Hsiu-chu (洪秀柱) as its 2016 presidential candidate some analysts 
spoke of a NPization (新黨化) of the KMT.75 If we consider how damaging the NP was to the 
KMT in the 1990s, then the transformation of the party’s relationship must be considered a 
long-term success. The KMT has been able to reintegrate many of the NP’s strongest 
politicians but at the same time maintain a close working relationship. Even where the NP 
does nominate such as Taipei city council, it no longer appears to threaten the KMT and in 
return the NP actively campaigns for KMT candidates such as recently in the 2014 Taipei 
mayoral and 2016 presidential elections. In other words, the NP operates as somewhere 
between a friendly allied party and a party faction. Lastly, the partial takeover of the NP was 
a crucial step in the KMT’s struggle to create a unified Pan Blue camp in the run up to its 
return to power in 2008. The model the KMT adopted for reintegrating the NP in 2004 was 
one that would subsequently be employed for the more complex task of re-absorbing the 
larger splinter, the PFP. This is the focus of the fourth and final case study. 
 
Case 4: The Kuomintang and People First Party: From a failed merger to a negotiated 
takeover 
 
The fourth case should have been the easiest merger. The PFP and KMT were similar in size 
for much of the DPP era and after the departure of Lee Teng-hui from the KMT, the two 
were ideologically much closer. In addition the two party chairs Lien and Soong were able to 
get over their earlier bitter rivalry from the 2000 presidential election and develop a close 
working relationship. However, despite extensive merger talks the eventual outcome was 
 
75 Liberty Times, 29 June 2015. 
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essentially a KMT negotiated takeover. Between the establishment of the PFP in April 2000 
and the KMT’s virtual takeover of the PFP in late 2007, the relationship between the parties 
went through a number of stages. The first phase that lasted through until the December 
2002 local elections, featured intense competition over which would be the dominant Pan 
Blue party. 
A new phase of cooperation emerged in the aftermath of the 2002 elections. The parties 
were able to reach agreement for a joint presidential ticket with Lien as the presidential and 
Soong as vice presidential candidate. At this time the KMT’s Lien first raised the idea of a 
party merger arguing that Taiwan was already moving towards a two party system and that 
the PFP, NP and KMT should discuss the steps towards a merger.76 The PFP immediately 
rejected this KMT suggestion, with the PFP’s Chang Hsien-yao (張顯耀) explaining “A party 
merger before the election is impossible and impossible after the election.”77 
Following the joint presidential ticket’s narrow defeat in March 2004, the KMT attempted to 
hasten the merger process. In May Lien tabled a KMT-PFP merger proposal that would see a 
merger working group set up and aimed to see the parties merged in July. However, Soong 
explained that there was not yet a timetable for a merger, agreement on post merger name 
and that the KMT needed to deal with its political corruption problems and that the parties 
still had major differences on localization.78 Nevertheless the first merger working group 
meetings were held in July, though it was agreed to delay the merger until after the 
December 2004 legislative election.79 
Pressure for a merger grew as the 2004 election campaign hotted up. The difference though 
was that for the first time calls for merger came from the PFP. In September Soong 
proposed a merger timetable, calling for the creation of a new party in February 2005, 
noting that the new party’s name was something to be discussed. 80 Then on September 21 
PFP legislators Lee Ching-hua and Diane Lee (李慶安) called on the parties to merge prior to 
the National Day (October 10), describing this as the best birthday present for the Republic 
of China. 81 
The February target set by Soong was however not met. While the KMT was celebrating its 
December 2004 election victory, Soong argued that the KMT had broken its promises and 
 
76  UDN, 19 December 2002, 4. 
77  UDN, 25 January 2003, 6. 
78  UDN, 20 May 2004, A3. 
79  UDN, 15 July, 2004, 4. 
 
 
80  UDN, 1 September 2004, A4. 
 
81   UDN, 22 September 2004, A10. 
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that “They have closed the gates (to merger).”82 At this time of growing PFP KMT tensions a 
key precedent was made when PFP legislator Chou Hsi-wei (周錫瑋) rejoined the KMT in 
order to contest the KMT’s primary for Taipei County in April 2005. The PFP’s response was 
to immediately suspend his membership.83 
It was not until the aftermath of the December 2005 local elections that the merger issue 
returned to the agenda. However, the urgency to merge now mainly came from the large 
pro merger faction within the PFP. Working group meetings were held between PFP and 
KMT, with Ma (but not Soong) joining the discussions on December 8.84 However, it was 
clear that the long awaited Ma-Soong meeting would be decisive; this tense four hour 
meeting was held on December 13.85 Although they agreed to leave specifics on future 
nomination for later discussion, there was no breakthrough on a party merger. 
 
We regard the aborted merger talks of December 2005 as the cut off point between a failed 
merger and the new process of a negotiated takeover that would play out through to 2008. 
What had been a trickle of defections in 2005 became a major wave as the merger faction in 
the PFP switched to the KMT in 2006-7. As the 2008 Legislative elections approached KMT- 
PFP discussions revived in 2007. The challenge was what to do with the remaining PFP 
legislators that had not defected. In September it was announced that a new target for 
party merger would be after the Legislative Yuan elections in February 2008.86 After 
negotiations between KMT chair Wu Po-hsiung (吳伯雄) and Soong it was announced that 
the remaining PFP legislators would return to the KMT and six would stand as district 
candidates with full KMT support.87 Former KMT secretary general Wu Tun-yi (吳敦義) 
explained his understanding of these negotiations, “So in reality the two parties have 
become one. Although the names are still separate, as we still maintain Chairman Soong’s 
position as a party chairman.”88 Once again though a merger target was missed, as this was 
not achieved in February 2008. The election results left the KMT with three quarters of the 
seats in parliament and the PFP just one. As Wu suggested the two parties had effectively 
become one, but it was more a negotiated takeover than a merger. 
 
Contextual factors 
 
Electoral factors and the electoral system played a key role in the development of the 
integration process between the KMT and PFP after 2000. Soong’s almost successful 
presidential bid in 2000, high levels of party identification and remarkable election results in 
 
 
82  UDN, 13 December 2004, A5. 
83   UDN, 14 April 2005, A1. 
84 UDN, 9 December 2005, A3. 
85  UDN, 13 December 2005, A2. 
 
86   UDN , 23 September  2007, A4 
87   UDN, 15 November 2007, UDN A4. 
88 Interview, Taipei, 25 July 2008. 
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2001, gave it the confidence to go it alone initially. The PFP thrived in the SNTV electoral 
system. After 2002 though the party identification trend shifted in the KMT’s favour with 
PFP party identification down to 9.6 compared to the KMT’s 21.2 in 2004. 
In 2004 the KMT again responded to a second presidential defeat with the call for a merger 
and though the PFP’s reduced support levels meant it did not reject this proposal outright, 
the PFP still had the strength to make clear its preference for cooperation rather than 
merger. However, December 2004 legislative election results served to undermine the 
merger project. Although the Pan Blue camp retained its majority, the KMT had risen from 
68 to 79 seats and the PFP fell from 46 to 34 seats. Thus the PFP broke off talks believing the 
KMT had deliberately profited at the PFP’s expense. However by late 2005 party 
identification shifts made the PFP more willing to talk about a merger and PFP politicians 
began to defect. The new electoral system did have a mechanical effect as the challenge of 
the SMD two vote system not only encouraged defection towards the larger party but also 
put pressure on the PFP to find a way out for its remaining politicians. By 2006 the relative 
party identification was 2.7 for the PFP to 35.5 for the KMT, giving the KMT much greater 
ability to dominate the integration process. According to KMT Secretary General Wu both 
sides stood to benefit from the nomination agreement in 2008, “That is because if they 
didn’t use the KMT flag they wouldn’t be able to get elected. So they had to join the KMT. In 
some places our people might not win, and they had strong candidates. They needed our 
nomination and flag and we needed their talented politicians to join our party.”89 However, 
relative party sizes and electoral system factors cannot tell the whole story, as in late 2005 
the PFP had sufficient numbers of strong legislators to survive as an independent entity 
even in the new electoral system. 
 
Inter-party factors 
 
Of the four cases examined ideology was the least important in the KMT-PFP integration 
process. One of the key selling points of the PFP had been its relatively vague ideological 
positions compared to the NP. However, one interesting pattern in the negotiations process 
was that the PFP repeatedly raised policy issues as a means to stall negotiations. For 
instance, on separate occasions the PFP demanded the KMT first deal with its China policy, 
its party assets and political corruption problems before the PFP would consider a merger.90 
Trust is a core ingredient of a successful merger, however, this was clearly often lacking. For 
instance, though Lien and Soong were able to get over the animosity left over from the 2000 
campaign, trust was often broken down by open criticism of negotiations coming from both 
camps. Although many in the PFP had originated from the KMT, a faction of the PFP held 
highly hostile positions regarding the KMT. A representative figure whose criticisms of the 
KMT often undermined cross-party trust was PFP vice chair Chang Chao-hsiung. This is 
 
 
89 Interview, Taipei, 25 July 2008. 
90  UDN 2005 May 19, A4. 
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apparent from his comments after the December 2004 elections, “The first time we were 
tricked (by the KMT) we were honest and did not understand, the second time we were 
tricked we were honest and tolerant (忠厚), if we get tricked for a third time we have to 
admit to being idiots.”91 
When we consider Lee, Hough and Keith arguments on merger negotiations we can see how 
the merger working groups were never allowed to fully function in this case. Not only were 
they subject to open criticism from fellow partisans opposed to merger but also party 
leaders took a highly hands on role rather than delegating power to the working groups. For 
instance KMT chair Ma personally joined the working group discussions in December 2005 
and the Ma-Soong meeting later that week overrode any agreements the working groups 
reached. 
Inner Party factors: 
 
Lastly, inner-party factors were critical in shaping the direction of integration. On paper 
there was far less change within the PFP. Throughout the period Soong was chair and Chang 
vice chair of the party. While Chang was consistently hostile towards the KMT and Soong’s 
position on merger did change and soften over time as his own and the PFP’s strength 
ebbed. Thus once Soong's popularity had steeply declined by early 2005 his cautious 
attitude was being openly challenged by the merger faction in the PFP and these were the 
first politicians to defect in 2006. However, KMT sources tended to blame Soong’s 
changeable attitude towards merger as the key factor preventing the merger taking place.92 
When it came to the KMT Lien played a key role promoting integration with the PFP despite 
internal criticism. Presidential advisor Hsu Li-teh (徐立德) who acted as a go-between in 
PFP-KMT negotiations described in his autobiography how Lien tried to create the right 
conditions for Soong to return to the KMT.93 However, he did not have the same power 
within the KMT as Lee Teng-hui and this was made clear when internal opposition played a 
key role in the shelving of the May 2004 merger proposal. It is quite likely that if Lien had 
been able to serve a second term as KMT chair, then a more equal format of integration 
could have been achieved. However, once Ma became KMT Chair the takeover process 
began in earnest. The atmosphere of the May 2005 Ma-Soong merger talks reflects the 
deep animosity between these two party leaders. This was apparent when after the meeting 
Ma even joked to reporters, “we do not need to call an ambulance.”94 It is also noteworthy 
that the parties were able to reach an agreement in 2007 to resolve the PFP’s remaining 
legislators when Wu Po-hsiung temporarily replaced Ma as KMT Chairman in February 2007. 
Wu’s more conciliatory style helped the parties overcome their differences to reach this 
agreement. 
 
91  Ibid. 
92 UDN, 4 September 2010, A4. 
93 Ibid. 
94  UDN, 14 December 2005, A4. 
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Success of the takeover 
 
If we take the electoral results in 2008 as a measure then initially the takeover of the PFP 
was a remarkable success. The KMT won historic presidential and legislative election 
victories that stand in sharp contrast to 2004 when there were two separate parties. The 
party system was transformed as there was now a unified Pan Blue party more dominant 
than at any time since democratization. From the perspective of party unity it was also 
successful as the new members were well integrated into the KMT and did not form an 
independent faction or switch back to the PFP. From the perspective of the PFP politicians’ 
career it was also very successful as the majority won election after rejoining the KMT and 
most won re-election in 2012 as well. Ideologically they also fitted in well with the Ma led 
KMT and its new Chinese nationalist appeals. In the long-term, however, the takeover would 
have negative consequences for the KMT. Unlike the case of the NP, the PFP ended up taking 
an adversarial stance towards the KMT after 2010. This was apparent during the 2012 and 
2016 national elections when the Soong stood as presidential candidate and the party 
nominated district candidates (mainly against KMT incumbents) and a party list. This going 
its own way did pay off as the PFP was able to win three seats and get back into Legislative 
Yuan in 2012. Moreover, in the 2016 national elections Soong’s PFP was even more 
damaging to the KMT and for part of the campaign it looked as if Soong might even win 
more votes than the KMT presidential candidate. In other words, of all the four cases the 
PFP has proved the most successful at post takeover recovery. 
Conclusions 
 
This study represents the first attempt to systematically examine the process of party 
mergers and takeovers in Taiwan’s party system. This has been achieved by examining four 
cases. We hope our study offers some contribution to both the Taiwanese party literature 
but also the broader literature on party merging and takeovers. We have summarised our 
findings in Table 2. 
Table 2 Summary of Cases 
 
 Classification Contextual 
factors 
Inter-party 
factors 
Inner-party 
factors 
Success 
evaluation 
CSDP-NP A merger Poor electoral 
results (CSDP) 
 
Similar relative 
sizes 
Close 
ideological 
positions 
 
 
Successful 
cooperation 
Leadership 
supportive 
Short –term 
success 
 
Long-term 
Failure 
PFP-NP A hostile Different Lack of trust; Hostile Short-term 
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 takeover relative sizes Ideological 
differences 
leadership mixed success 
 
Long-term 
failure 
KMT-NP A negotiated 
takeover 
Poor electoral 
results; 
 
Different 
relative sizes; 
 
Electoral 
system 
Close 
ideological 
positions 
 
 
Successful 
cooperation 
Leadership 
supportive 
Short and 
long-term 
success 
KMT-PFP From a failed 
merger to a 
negotiated 
takeover 
New electoral 
system 
 
From similar 
relative sizes to 
one dominant. 
Mixed 
cooperation 
experience 
Leadership 
positions 
fluctuate 
(2002-2005) 
then 
leadership 
supportive 
(2007-8) 
Short-term 
success 
 
Long-term 
failure 
 
 
Firstly the study has shown the importance of examining a variety of merger outcomes 
rather than just successful cases. This approach allows us to examine a wider set of cases 
and also offers greater insights into how to explain variation in outcomes. We employed a 
classification scheme that used relative party power and the inter-party relationship to 
classify the types of outcome. We proposed five possible outcomes and our case studies 
included four of these: merger (NP-CSDP), failed merger (KMT-PFP stage 1), hostile takeover 
(PFP-NP), and negotiated takeover (KMT-NP & KMT-PFP stage 2). 
We attempted to contribute to the discussion on how to explain the outcome of attempted 
mergers and takeovers by applying the framework suggested by Coffe and Torenvlied that 
looks at the process through the interplay of contextual, inter-party and inner party factors. 
We found that the best conditions for merger included similar relative party power, closer 
ideological positions, successful pre-merger cooperation and supportive leadership. In 
contrast, though the PFP-KMT had some of these conditions (similar size and ideological 
positions), poor cooperation experience and changeable leadership positions on mergers 
led to the failed merger (stage 1). Large relative size advantage determined whether the 
process developed into a takeover rather than a merger. However, our cases revealed that 
other inter-party and inner-party variables would determine whether the outcome was a 
negotiated or hostile takeover. In particular, we found that closer ideological positions, 
inter-party trust and leadership supportive of integration made a negotiated takeover more 
likely (KMT-NP & KMT-PFP stage 2). In contrast, low trust or aggressive attitudes in 
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negotiations could backfire with potentially negative consequences, as was seen in the NP- 
PFP hostile takeover. 
We were also interested in how to assess the impact of mergers or takeovers. We also have 
shown how the merger outcomes had a major influence on the shaping of Taiwan’s party 
system. We made a distinction between long and short-term impacts of mergers/takeovers. 
In the short-term, we found all four of our cases featured significant benefits in gaining 
human resources and improved post fusion election results. Nevertheless, we have 
categorised three out of our four cases as long-term failures. For instance, the PFP was able 
to recover sufficiently to undermine the KMT electorally after 2010, while the CSDP faction 
within the NP had been entirely lost within three years of the merger. 
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